The doctrine of willful blindness developed as a theory in English case law that states that it was relevant to prove that the defendant had sufficient knowledge to be held accountable for his actions. One of the first British cases to use the doctrine of willful blindness was Regina v. Sleep2, where the court ruled that the defendant could not be convicted of possession of a “naval enterprise” unless he knew “that the goods were government transactions or that he deliberately turned a blind eye to this fact”3. This led to subsequent decisions of the English courts, which showed that actual knowledge was not necessary if it could be shown that the defendant had deliberately turned a blind eye to the case and or had not established facts that would complement his knowledge of the act4. This was later referred to as the mindset that accompanied one who “intentionally closed his eyes,” such as “tolerance” or “constructive knowledge.” A company may also be held liable on the basis of the collective knowledge of its representatives. According to this doctrine, the knowledge of several agents is combined to determine the collective knowledge necessary to impose responsibility on the company. The aggregate knowledge of the company`s representatives prevents the company from avoiding any liability only by sharing the functions of its representatives. Thus, according to the doctrine of collective knowledge, a company can be held liable even if no agent of the company knows enough information to be held responsible for the crime. The Court of Appeal then noted that, in the triassicing of the case, it was for the judge to determine whether the dealers` trade in CarbonDesk had been dishonest in light of all the relevant circumstances, including the unprecedented volume of transactions and the mindset of the traders, particularly to their knowledge (real or supposed).
Beliefs and conduct (including, but not limited to, their relationship with the RBS SEEL Compliance Officer). Although the Global-Tech case provided the courts with a one-sided definition of “intentional blindness” as a person who takes deliberate steps to avoid a high probability of misconduct, and who can almost be said to have actually known the critical facts, there are still difficulties in proving the “intentional acts” and the extent of the accused acts. by tying blinders to avoid knowledge or verification of an incriminating act. As a result, some have argued that in future judgments, courts should move away from these possible interpretations and instead adopt the entire review of the circumstances.8 In such a case, the courts must have the discretion and flexibility to assess the facts of the case and determine the degree of “intentional act” necessary to prove intentional blindness. The Court of Appeal highlighted the following key principles regarding the criteria of dishonest support and blind knowledge: The doctrine of intentional blindness is also applied in corporate liability cases, such as the case of the Attorney General for Tuvalu and Another v. Philatelic Distribution Corp Ltd and Others  LRC (Comm) 4499. This case concerned the liability of a director of a corporation for contempt of court if the corporation disregards a judgment or order requiring him to refrain from an act. In its judgment, the Court held that, where a company is responsible for not performing certain acts or not giving an obligation of equivalent effect and a director of that company is aware of the order or obligation, it is required to take appropriate measures to ensure compliance with the order or obligation, and if it wilfully fails to take such action and the order or obligation is breached, It may be punished for contempt. In the event of a failure to monitor or investigate, or intentional blindness on the part of a director of a company, his conduct may be considered intentional. For example, in United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., the bank has been found guilty of numerous violations of the Currency Transaction Reporting Act.
This law requires financial institutions to report transactions from customers over $10,000. However, the bank did not investigate a customer`s reportable transaction if the customer withdrew more than $10,000 using multiple separate cheques instead of a single cheque. The court concluded that the bank`s failure to deliberately investigate the ability to report these transactions was due to indifference to the law and therefore led to a finding of intentional blindness. In addition, responsibility for intentional blindness does not lie solely with the managers. Non-executive directors would also be held liable if they concluded that such misdeeds had been committed against the company and turned a blind eye. In Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills v Akbar v Akbar  EWHC 285610, it was found that non-executive directors have the same duties and responsibilities as managing directors. They would be obliged to stay informed about the management of the company and to question the decisions of the managers. Other common law countries have attempted to erode the ambiguity of the doctrine by using a “test” to determine how the doctrine should be applied in certain cases — in this particular case, it was drug abuse. For example, in the landmark case of Adili Chibuike Ejike v.
Prosecutor  SGCA 38, the Singapore Court of Appeal clarified whether a defendant is intentionally blind to his knowledge that he was in possession of the drug. This led to three notable implications of the concept of deliberate blindness: “The historic decision on intentional blindness did not yield results,” Daily Journal, April 4, 2014. In conclusion, it is clear that despite the ambiguities faced by the English and Malaysian courts when interpreting the doctrine of intentional blindness, one relevant legal principle remains: which is used in common law countries when it comes to “avoiding knowledge” and whether it can be an autonomous decision of an individual or a conscious decision to avoid self-incrimination. The principle of deliberate blindness has often been challenged in court. In criminal law, intentional blindness or ignorance of the law refers to “the deliberate avoidance of knowledge of the facts”; That is, a person avoids acquiring knowledge to avoid self-incrimination1. In its purest form, intentional blindness (also known as Nelson`s blindness) refers to the act of intentionally turning a blind eye to a manifestly illegal situation. An example of this can be seen when an accused person has deliberately turned a blind eye to knowledge of possession and/or knowledge of the use of illegal substances, the law may consider this to be the equivalent of actual knowledge. Intentional blindness is a term used in the law to describe a situation in which a person tries to avoid civil or criminal liability for an illegal act by intentionally ignoring the facts that would make them responsible or involved. In United States v. Jewell, the Court held that the evidence of intentional ignorance met the requirement of knowledge of the criminal possession and importation of drugs.
: 225 The Court of Appeal stated that it was not necessary to deal with the applicants` cross-appeal (to the extent that it was based on the argument that the unfair support test was met before the High Court had found it), since the reopening of the proceedings meant that all questions of fact, including the crucial question of whether and, if so, when the dealers met the blind knowledge test in Manifest Shipping v Polaris  UKHL 1 would be a question that the new trial judge would have to decide. Intentional blindness or intentional blindness is sometimes called ignorance of the law.:761 Intentional ignorance, constructed ignorance, conscious avoidance, intentional ignorance, or knowledge of Nelson. A famous example of rejecting such a defense occurred in In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, in which the defendants argued that file exchange technology was designed to have no way of monitoring the contents of outsourced files. They suggested that their inability to monitor users` activities meant that they could not contribute to copyright infringement by users. The court ruled that this was intentional blindness on the part of the defendant and would not constitute a defense against a claim for contributory damages. A request to inform the jury of intentional blindness usually results in weak evidence of knowledge, without prior warning to the defense, and invites the jury to convict on the basis of evidence of simple negligence or recklessness. In 2011, with the civil patent infringement proceedings Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., the Supreme Court has upheld the validity of the doctrine of willful blindness in civil and criminal environments, while establishing certain standards for the application of the doctrine that go beyond those required in most federal district courts.